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BSTRACT
 
In this article, the trends and determinants of voter turnout in India at the state
level are explored. It reveals that there is a large variation in turnout across the Indian states.
Although turnout in most Indian states has increased over time, there are also many excep-
tions to this upward trend. These empirical results are consistent with the “rational-voter
model”, whereby turnout tends to be higher where elections are closely fought and literacy is
higher. Further, a larger electorate and higher proportion of urban population is associated
with lower turnout in the Indian states.
 
Introduction
 
Voter turnout is a widely studied phenomenon in the comparative politics litera-
ture. In particular, a lot of attention has been paid to the decline in turnout in the
western democracies, and scholars have debated the reasons and the effects of this
decline. Declining turnout tends to be associated with citizens’ lack of interest in
the democratic process, and also dilutes the legitimacy of the electoral results.
Scholars have also related the decline in turnout to disenfranchisement of socially
and economically backward groups, and questioned whether democracy in such a
scenario is truly representative. As Lijphart (1997: 1) puts it, “Political equality
and political participation are both basic democratic ideals”. Some studies have
also debated whether changes in turnout can affect electoral outcomes and support
for a particular party (for example Radcliff, 1994, 1995; Erikson, 1995a, 1995b).
While turnout has generally been declining in most Western democracies, it has
actually increased in India since its first elections in 1951. This upward trend has
been highlighted by scholars as an important factor in the sustenance of Indian
democracy, where citizens participate in increasing numbers to choose their
governments election after election (see for example Yadav, 2000).
In this article, I seek to explore the trends and determinants of turnout in India at
the state level.
 
1
 
 The Indian case is interesting because the turnout is high despite the
presence of a large illiterate and economically backward population. As Varshney
(2000: 20) notes, “The deprived seem to have greater faith in India’s elections than
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the advantaged”. Since electoral outcomes have important policy implications, it is
vital to understand the degree of and reasons for geographical differentials in turn-
out in India, something which is not adequately addressed in the existing literature. I
focus on turnout at the state level since Indian states are significant political actors,
and responsible for providing valuable public goods to the citizens (Chhibber &
Noorudin, 2004). Furthermore, political parties in India tend to be organized at the
state level, and the elections are planned and fought on a state-by-state basis.
 
Theoretical and Empirical Literature
 
Early studies (see Gosnell, 1927) assume that turnout depends on the character of
the election itself, rather than on the voters. Thus, for example, lower turnout is
expected where parties do not clearly communicate their policies to the voters, and a
high turnout is expected when policies are well presented, or where electoral
competition is expected to be close. Recent scholarship on turnout focuses less on
the characteristics of the elections, and more on the motivation of the individual
voter and on parties’ efforts to mobilize support for its policies.
Downs’ (1957) “rational voter model” has been a dominant theory of voter partic-
ipation in the literature, and has been extended theoretically and tested empirically
by many scholars (for example Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Riker & Ordeshook,
1968; Tullock, 1971; Cox & Munger, 1989; Aldrich, 1993; Feddersen, 2004). The
rational choice model focuses on the cost–benefit analysis of the voting decision.
According to Riker and Ordeshook (1968), since a single vote has virtually no effect
on the election outcome, a voter cannot be expected to vote for gaining just material
benefits. Instead, the only rational reason to vote is to gain benefits such as express-
ing an opinion or fulfilling a duty. Some scholars explain the voting decision as
based on a habit which in turn depends on factors such as their social status and
education. Verba and Nie (1972) put forward a model of electoral participation based
on education and profession, and studies such as Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980),
and Parry 
 
et al.
 
 (1992) use this resource model in their studies of voter turnout. The
mobilization model complements the resource model and focuses on how the various
parties, interest groups and candidates mobilize people to vote (Rosenstone &
Hansen, 1993). Low turnout elections have often been referred to as low mobiliza-
tion elections, and mobilization is a mechanism that works by way of both rationality
and socialization (Franklin, 2004).
The empirical literature on the determinants of turnout tends to focus on cross-
national research in Western democracies. The dominant view in the existing
studies points toward the primacy of institutional variables in affecting the variation
in turnout across nations, although some authors also include sociological variables
in their analyses. An important variable in the turnout literature focuses on the
competitiveness of the elections. According to Blais (2000: 60), “the verdict is
crystal clear with respect to closeness: closeness has been found to increase turnout
… There are strong reasons to believe that, as predicted by rational choice theory,
more people vote when election is close”. Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) report that
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an increase in the gap between the leading and the second party by 10 points leads
to a reduction of 1–2 points in turnout. Similar results are reported in many other
empirical studies which include the closeness variable (for example Nevitte 
 
et al.
 
,
2000). Most studies measure the closeness of elections by the difference between
the votes secured by the winning and the runner-up party, typically at the national
level. However, as Blais (2006: 120) points out “It could be that what matters is the
closeness of the race at the district level”.
Scholars also recognize the importance of institutions and context in understand-
ing the variation in turnout across countries and over time. Powell (1986: 21–22)
finds that turnout is higher in countries with “nationally competitive districts” and
“strong party–group” linkages. Turnout in nationally competitive districts is helped
by parties and voters having equal incentives in all parts of the country, and by a
simplified voter choice due to clear party–group affiliation. Powell concludes that
party–group linkages represent the most important institutional variable affecting
voter turnout in the American context. Jackman (1987) shows that institutional and
party-system variables such as nationally competitive districts, disproportionality,
multipartyism, compulsory voting and unicameralism affect turnout. Other studies
such as Blais and Carty (1990), Jackman and Miller (1995), Franklin (1996),
Radcliff and Davis (2000), and Kostadinova (2003) have concluded that turnout
tends to be higher in countries with larger districts and/or proportional representa-
tion. However Blais (2006: 114) points out that “The perception is that we have
come up with a number of well-established propositions about how institutions
influence turnout. That perception may not be well founded … All in all, our under-
standing of the impact of institutions on turnout is shaky”.
Powell (1982) finds that turnout is higher in economically developed countries. In
many subsequent studies, too, there is strong support for this view (Blais & Dobrzyn-
ska, 1998; Norris, 2002; Fornos 
 
et al.
 
, 2004). However, as Radcliff (1992) points out,
economic hardship may induce people to mobilize to redress grievances, but it may
also lead them to become alienated and withdraw from the political process. In this
context, many studies do not report any effect of downturn in the economy on turnout
(Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998; Kostadinova, 2003; Fornos 
 
et al.
 
, 2004). Blais and
Dobrzynska (1998) find that the highest levels of turnout are reported in small coun-
tries. Blais (2006) argues that this might result from stronger social network, or voters
believing that their vote could be decisive in a small country, and finally because in
small countries it is easier for candidates and parties to mobilize the vote.
Scholars have also used socio-economic, party and electoral system variables to
understand the turnout phenomenon. Lipset (1960: 182) concludes that “The better
educated [vote] more than the less educated … higher-status, more than lower”.
Similarly, Berelson and Steiner (1964: 423) report that “the higher a person’s
socioeconomic and educational level – especially the latter – the higher his [or her]
political interest, participation, and turnout. Cebula and Toma (2006: 35) point out, 
Greater average levels of educational attainment may lead to the subjective
evaluation that voting 
 
per se
 
 yields greater benefits, regardless of the election
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outcome, insofar as voting may serve: (a) To create positive feelings about
fulfilling one’s civic duty; (b) to create the feeling of helping to maintain the
vitality and survival of the democratic process; and (c) to create the feeling of
helping to clarify the degree to which election victors can interpret their victo-
ries as either only marginal or as a mandate for implementing the espoused
policies/party platforms.
Scholars have also studied the role of parties and interest groups in mobilizing
voters, and their influence on the voting decision (for example Rosenstone &
Hansen, 1993). According to this view, a higher number of parties provides wider
choice of policy platforms to the voters, and also helps in mobilizing voters, and this
in turn leads to a higher turnout. However, the effect can also work in the opposite
direction because more parties increases the probability of a coalition government
(Downs, 1957), and therefore Blais (2006: 118) concludes that “Because of these
possible contradictory consequences, it is not clear whether we should expect the
correlation of turnout with the number of parties to be positive, negative, or nonex-
istent”. Many studies report a negative relationship between turnout and number of
parties (Jackman, 1987; Blais & Carty, 1990; Jackman & Miller, 1995; Blais &
Dobrzynska, 1998; Kostadinova, 2003). These empirical findings imply that the
usual explanations of more parties increasing turnout are not supported by evidence,
implying that the opposite explanations regarding the expectation of coalition
government might be true. However, Blais and Carty (1990) and Blais and
Dobrzynska (1998) show that turnout is not higher in elections which result in
single-party governments. Blais (2006: 119) argues, 
what really matters is clarity of choice, that is, voters need to know with rela-
tive certainty the coalitions that might be formed … As things stand now, the
fact that turnout appears to be lower when there are more parties is intuitively
odd, and the supposition that this is so because more parties mean less decisive
elections in only a supposition.
In the Indian context, “what constitutes a party” is itself an important question since
parties are increasingly forming alliances at the state level which in turn shape party
systems in the Indian states.
Finally, authors have also argued for the need for a dynamic analysis of turnout,
and as Blais (2006: 121) argues, “many variables differ from one election to
another, and for these variables the analysis should be explicitly dynamic”. Franklin
(2004) takes into account the dynamic nature of the analysis by including turnout in
previous elections as a control variable.
Literature focusing on determinants of turnout in India is limited, and consists
mainly of the works by Yadav (2000) and McMillan (2005). Yadav (2000) disag-
gregates turnout statistics in India in terms of regions and prominent social
groups to understand the changing nature of political participation in India in the
1990s. Yadav’s key thesis is that although overall turnout figures have not
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increased dramatically (in the 1990s), the composition of those who vote has
undergone a major change. In particular, he notes that there is a democratic
upsurge among the socially underprivileged – the Scheduled Castes and Sched-
uled Tribes, while this increase in participation rates has not been seen in some
other disadvantaged groups, for instance Muslims and women. Yadav (2000:
133) concludes that “India is perhaps the only large democracy in the world
today where the turnout of the lower orders of the society is well above that of
the most privileged groups”. McMillan’s (2005) focus is on the effect of electoral
reservation of constituencies for candidates from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes on turnout. He uses evidence from survey data to conclude that although
voters in Scheduled Tribe constituencies are less likely to vote, there is no
evidence that Scheduled Tribes themselves vote significantly differently to other
voters (McMillan, 2005: 233). He reports similar results for Scheduled Caste
constituencies and finds that electoral reservation has little impact on turnout
behaviour of members of the Scheduled Castes. Furthermore, turnout in reserved
and general seats have shown a clear pattern of convergence over time. This
convergence is more prominent in the case of reserved Scheduled Tribe constitu-
encies, and represents a change in broader social mobilization, whereby those in
rural areas have become more likely to vote than those in urban areas. McMillan
(2005: 245) concludes that “the removal of reservation would have little effect on
either the overall level of voting or the turnout of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled
Tribes”.
In contrast to existing studies which examine turnout in India with reference to
specific social groups and period (Yadav, 2000; McMillan, 2005), my interest is to
seek a general explanation of the determinants of turnout through a comparative
empirical study. My study focuses on turnout in the Indian states, which have
become the dominant players in influencing national politics and government
formation. The approach taken in this study is that the decision to vote is determined
not only by a simple cost–benefit analysis based on rational-choice model, but also
by socio-economic, electoral and party system variables. Thus, I combine the
insights from the main theoretical approaches largely based on Western societies
with some India-specific factors for my empirical analysis.
 
Voter Turnout Trends in the Indian States
 
Figure 1 shows histogram of turnout in the Indian states over the 14 general elec-
tions between 1951 and 2004. Turnout is measured as number of actual votes as a
percentage of the total eligible voting population in an Indian state measured for a
particular election. The curve shown represents kernel density, which resembles
normal distribution meaning a well-spread-out distribution around the mean. There
is a large concentration of points between 50% and 70%, with the modal value being
around 58%. The level of turnout in India is similar or even higher than seen in
many Western democracies, and is described by many commentators both as a
contributor to and the consequence of the success of Indian democracy.
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Figure 1. Histogram of voter turnout in the Indian states 1951–2004
 
Furthermore, turnout has increased over the years indicating the citizens’ engage-
ment in the political process despite widespread poverty and illiteracy. Figure 2
shows a box plot of turnout trends in the Indian states in the 14 general elections.
Each box represents turnout in a particular election year at the state level, and also
shows the range of inter-state variation in that particular year.
 
2
 
 The boxes are drawn
so that their lower and the upper bounds represent 25th and 75th percentile values of
the distribution within a particular year. Similarly, the upper and lower bounds of the
two whiskers represent almost the whole distribution, while the points outside the
whiskers show the outliers. The line drawn inside each box shows the median turnout
in a particular election. As can be seen, turnout varies widely across the Indian states,
and also over time, thus providing an interesting area of research.
 
Figure 2. Box plot of turnout across the Indian states over time
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of turnout in the Indian states by election
year. The average turnout in the Indian states was 47.1% in the first general election,
and thereafter it increased sharply over the next three elections rising to 65.4% in
1967. In the first two elections – 1951 and 1957 – turnout was low; during this
period parties were not especially strong, and the Indian party system both at the
national level and the state level was dominated by the Indian National Congress
(see Kothari, 1964). The period 1957 to 1967 witnessed a large increase in turnout,
and was characterized by development of opposition to Congress, and a move
towards a decline of a party system dominated by one party. As Yadav (2000: 121)
notes, “the decade of the 1960s which, by all accounts, marked the first democratic
upsurge following the establishment of Indian democracy … Voter turnout went up
at all levels as political competition became serious and alternatives to the one-party
dominance of the Congress began emerging”.
The strengthening of party system and mobilization of voters by the parties seems
to be an important reason for this large increase in turnout seen in this period.
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Figure 1.
 
Histogram of voter turnout in the Indian states 1951–2004.
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Figure 2.
 
Box plot of turnout across the Indian states over time.
 
Table 1.
 
Voter turnout in the Indian states by election year
Year Mean Median Std. Deviation
1951 47.1 47.7 11.0
1957 48.2 47.4 9.3
1962 56.2 58.7 12.6
1967 65.4 66.5 10.1
1971 57.8 58.6 8.6
1977 61.6 60.5 11.4
1980 62.6 62.2 11.7
1984 69.2 67.4 10.7
1989 64.2 64.4 11.6
1991 58.9 58.6 12.7
1996 64.4 62.1 13.0
1998 64.5 63.2 10.0
1999 61.6 62.4 11.6
2004 61.6 61.6 11.9
 
Total 61.0 60.8 12.4
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Although Congress continued to be the dominant party during this period, elections
in many large states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Tamil Nadu became more
competitive, and this could provide part of the explanation of increase in turnout in
these states. On the other hand, in some other states, for example Kerala and West
Bengal, turnout increased substantially without any corresponding increase in the
competitiveness of the elections, thus indicating that mobilization of voters by
parties could also account for the increase in turnout in these states (see Appendix 1
for the trends and explanation of turnout and competitiveness of elections in these
states between 1957 and 1967).
Since the 1967 elections, the turnout has generally been above 60%, with the
overall average during all elections being 61%. The median value for the whole
period under consideration is 60.8% and has corresponded closely with the mean
value. The deviation around the mean has averaged 12.4% over all the elections, and
has remained stable during this period except for 1957 and 1971 elections where it
was 9.3% and 8.6% respectively.
Figure 3 shows a box plot of turnout across the Indian states.
 
3
 
 Each box repre-
sents the turnout for a state, the spread representing the variation over time for that
state. This further confirms the large cross-sectional variation in turnout across the
Indian states – which is the main focus of this paper.
 
Figure 3. Box plot of turnout in key Indian states
 
Table 2 presents turnout statistics on a cross-sectional basis for all election years
taken together. As can be seen, there is a wide variation in average turnout across
the Indian states. While Kerala, West Bengal and Haryana have turnout rates much
above the overall average, turnout in Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa, Madhya
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Figure 3.
 
Box plot of turnout in key Indian states.
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Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir is lower than the overall aver-
age. In addition to summary statistics, Table 2 also shows (in the last two columns)
the coefficient of the time trend and the corresponding 
 
p
 
 values.
 
4
 
 It is seen that while
for most of the states turnout shows a positive trend, there are few states where turn-
out has declined over the years. These states are Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu
and Kashmir, Maharashtra and Punjab. However, only Delhi, Gujarat, Jammu and
Kashmir and Maharashtra show statistically significant negative trends.
Table 3 shows that average turnout is lower in Hindi belt and North region than in
other regions.
 
5
 
 In particular, turnout tends to be higher in the states located in the
South and North East regions. It can be seen that only North region has shown a
decline in turnout, while other regions have witnessed an upward trend in turnout
rates, and that the upward trend is statistically significant for East, North East, Hindi
Belt and South regions.
In addition to the average turnout in the Indian states, it is also important to note
the turnout trends in the individual Indian states over time. These are shown in
Figure 4.
 
6
 
 
 
Figure 4. Voter turnout trends for key Indian states 1951–2004
 
Figure 4 confirms the findings from the summary statistics in Table 2 that most of
the Indian states have witnessed an upward trend in turnout over the years. However,
 
Table 2.
 
Voter turnout in key Indian states 1951–2004
State Mean Median Std. Deviation Trend (beta) p value
Andhra Pradesh 63.3 64.7 7.4 0.30 0.026
Assam 61.0 55.0 11.7 0.54 0.001
Bihar 54.6 58.4 7.9 0.42 0.000
Delhi 58.2 57.6 9.2
 
−
 
0.36 0.010
Gujarat 53.0 55.5 8.1
 
−
 
0.39 0.021
Haryana 67.4 65.8 3.5
 
−
 
0.09 0.352
Himachal Pradesh 51.9 57.5 13.0 0.61 0.001
Jammu and Kashmir 46.7 48.5 12.9
 
−
 
0.65 0.046
Karnataka 60.8 61.6 5.4 0.22 0.008
Kerala 71.6 71.1 5.3 0.07 0.520
Madhya Pradesh 50.8 52.7 6.5 0.22 0.035
Maharahstra 58.1 59.9 4.4
 
−
 
0.18 0.062
Manipur 65.7 66.5 11.0 0.29 0.100
Orissa 48.6 50.1 11.9 0.64 0.000
Punjab 59.5 61.9 11.4
 
−
 
0.09 0.653
Rajasthan 51.6 54.0 7.0 0.16 0.186
Tamil Nadu 64.4 66.7 7.7 0.02 0.873
Uttar Pradesh 51.8 50.5 9.4 0.23 0.146
West Bengal 68.0 72.8 13.1 0.72 0.000
 
All States 61.0 60.8 12.4 0.22 0.000
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the rate of increase varies across the states, and in few states such as Delhi, Gujarat
and Maharashtra, the turnout has actually declined over time.
The above analysis shows that while turnout has witnessed a general upward
trend, there is a wide variation across the Indian states, and this represents an inter-
esting research question to understand the determinants of turnout in the Indian
context. Yadav (2000: 124) summarizes the complexity involved in studying the
turnout trends in the Indian states by noting that “no single factor satisfactorily
explains either the direction or the quantum of the change in turnout in different
states [in the 1990s]. Usual explanations like the mobilization strategy of the polit-
ical parties, greater keenness of the contest, context of regime alteration, or the
Election Commission’s efficiency, do not seem to work here”. This necessitates
using a multivariate model to study determinants of turnout especially in the
Indian context.
 
Table 3.
 
Voter turnout in the Indian states by region 1951–2004
Region Mean Median Std. Deviation Trend (beta) p value
East 61.2 60.7 14.1 0.52 0.000
Hindi Belt 54.1 54.4 10.1 0.24 0.000
North 56.2 59.0 11.9 –0.29 0.028
North East 65.2 65.7 12.8 0.28 0.012
South 68.3 67.5 9.7 0.20 0.004
West 60.7 60.1 10.0 0.06 0.538
 
All States 61.0 60.8 12.4 0.22 0.000
 
Figure 4.
 
Voter turnout trends for key Indian states 1951–2004.
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Data and Methods
 
The dependent variable is turnout at the state level, while the independent variables
include measures of socio-economic characteristics, closeness of elections, social
heterogeneity and party system variables.
 
7
 
 The independent variables are discussed
below.
 
Socio-economic Characteristics
 
I use literacy rate, percentage urban population and the number of electors to repre-
sent the socio-economic characteristics of a state as key variables affecting turnout in
the Indian states. Higher degree of awareness and education enable voters to better
understand electoral and policy issues, as well as parties’ and candidates’ abilities to
fulfil their electoral promises. Thus, the higher the level of education in an Indian
state, the greater will be the voters’ appreciation of the importance of participating in
the democratic process, and therefore the higher the turnout will be.
 
8
 
 In the Indian
context, literacy brings some sort of privilege in that voters understand that they have
the power to influence electoral outcomes, and in a country with widespread illiter-
acy this might itself motivate a literate person to vote. Thus, literacy rate is specified
as one of the independent variables for determining turnout in the Indian states, and
I expect the relationship to be positive; higher turnout is expected in states with
higher literacy rates. The hypothesized effects of urbanization are based on sociolog-
ical theory which suggests that urbanization leads to a weakening of interpersonal
bonds, primary social structures and consensus and norms (Hoffman-Martinot, 1994:
14; Wirth, 1938). Geys (2006: 643) points out that cities are more individualistic thus
resulting in less social pressure to vote. Furthermore, cities tend to be more densely
populated, making it difficult for the voters to know the candidates and their policies
and thus increasing the information costs of voting in these areas (Geys, 2006: 643).
Elections in the rural areas, on the other hand, tend to be more personal and this can
lead to increased turnout (Blank, 1974; Davis, 1991; Geys, 2006). Accordingly, the
degree of urbanization is included as an independent variable in my study.
Blais (2000) argues that an increase in the size of electorate affects turnout
because it entails bringing in new people, and the associated difficulty in mobiliz-
ing them for voting. Further, Franklin (2002: 23) points out that an increase in the
proportion of new voters also has further consequences in that “An electorate with
more new voters will be an electorate that is more responsive to anything that
cause change … Changes in electorate size 
 
must
 
 have immediate effects on turnout
unless new voters vote at the same rate as existing voters”. According to Geys
(2006: 642), “Specifically, and intuitively apparent, the greater the size of the
community, the smaller the probability becomes that one single voter will make a
difference. This decreases the expected utility from voting and makes it more
likely that one abstains”.
In the Indian context, although the total size of electorate has increased, the aver-
age turnout (for all the states) at the state level has also increased. In this regard, it is
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important to note that the number of states in India have increased from 14 in the
1951 elections to 35 in the latest 2004 elections. And therefore, as I show in my
empirical results, while in the aggregate both the number of voters and the turnout
have increased over time, larger states tend to have lower turnout. Thus, while the
increase in the number of states (and reduction in average size of state) might have
helped to increase the aggregate turnout at the national level over time, the results of
this study indicate that the hypothesized negative relationship holds at the state level
in India. In my study, I include the size of the electorate as one of the independent
variables determining turnout.
 
Closeness of Elections
 
As discussed earlier, although many studies have found a relationship between
closeness of elections at national level and turnout, this variable is better studied at
the district level especially in Single-Member Plurality Systems (SMPS). Therefore,
I include a measure of closeness of elections at the district level as an independent
variable influencing turnout. In the Indian context, Yadav (2000) notes that rise in
turnout in scheduled caste (SC) reserved constituencies is likely to stem from a
higher level of competitiveness in these constituencies.
 
Social Heterogeneity
 
Cebula (2004: 218) argues that if voters feel “politically disenfranchised from their
governments because [of] … the government’s unresponsiveness to their needs …
they very likely may react emotionally by adopting a Why bother? attitude towards
voting”. Further, as Cebula and Toma (2006: 36) point out “This form of expressive
voting could very easily be expected of any minority that perceives itself as being
economically repressed or disadvantaged in the society”. On the other hand, it is also
possible that the minorities turn out in large numbers at the elections to try and influ-
ence the policy outcomes, and improve their situation. Therefore, although the effect
of the presence of minority groups in the electorate is an important variable, its effect
on the turnout is not unambiguous. In the Indian context, the presence of socially
disadvantaged groups such as the SC and scheduled tribes (ST) may therefore affect
turnout patterns across the Indian states. The hypothesis is that these groups wish to
use the voting power they have to express their opinion, even though their influence
on the electoral outcome depends on the distribution of their population in electoral
districts. Accordingly, I include the percentage population of these groups and an
overall measure of social heterogeneity in the Indian states as independent variables
in my regression models.
 
Party System
 
I use the number of contesting parties – the number of candidates who contest elec-
tions in the Indian states – to represent the size of the party system as one of the
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explanatory variables. The raw number of parties rather than the effective number
of parties (weighted by the votes received by them) is a more relevant variable in
affecting turnout.
 
9
 
 As mentioned earlier, there is a growing phenomenon of elec-
toral alliances rather than individual parties determining the shape of the party
system in the Indian states. However, the effect of this variable is difficult to
measure and interpret.
Finally, I also add a dummy independent variable representing the presence of
separatist movements in the states of Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir and Assam to
account for the effect of any disruption to the democratic process in these states.
 
10
 
It is important to note that there are many significant contextual variables that
could influence turnout, but are not included in my empirical model because of
measurement issues, and the associated difficulty in modelling them in a compara-
tive study. For example, poor voters might lose a part of their day’s wage if they
decide to vote, and this factor can affect turnout in poor constituencies. Political
violence and intimidation of voters on polling days is another factor which affects
turnout in many states, but it is difficult to measure and use in an empirical study.
 
11
 
Table 4 shows the dependent and independent variables used in the regression
models.
 
12
 
Methodology
 
Since my data includes cross-sectional (states) and time series (election years)
observations, there is a need to use appropriate estimator of regression coefficients,
and also suitably correct the resulting standard errors and 
 
z-
 
values (Wooldridge,
2002; Green, 2003).
Furthermore, there is a need to address potential problems caused by autocorre-
lation and heteroskedacity in the regression analysis (Green, 2003).
 
13
 
 Literature
also suggests using panel data methods such as the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) –
also called the dummy variable approach and the Random Effects Model (REM) to
model the unit level heterogeneity. While FEM assumes that each unit has its own
intercept, REM treats the intercept as a random constant term (Green, 2003).
Regarding FEM, Beck (2001: 285) points out: 
Fixed effects are clearly collinear with any independent variables that are
unchanging attributes of the units, so they force us to drop such unchanging
variables from the specification … These variables (perhaps characteristics
such as democracy) might be of interest …, the fixed effects will soak up most
of the explanatory power of those slowly changing variables. Thus, if a variable
… changes over time, but slowly, the fixed effects will make it hard for such
variables to appear either substantively or statistically significant.
According to Green (2003: 301), “From a purely practical standpoint, the dummy
variable (FEM) approach is costly in terms of degrees of freedoms lost”. Since my
institutional and sociological independent variables either do not vary over time or
Downloaded By: [Diwakar, Rekha] At: 10:56 1 February 2008 
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Table 4.
 
Variable category Variable description Variable name Measurement method Expected association
 
Dependent
 
Voter turnout
 
TURNOUT
 
No. of votes / No. of electors*100 
 
Independent
 
Socio-economic No of electors
 
ELECT
 
Natural log of number of electors –
Literacy rate
 
LITER
 
Literate population / total population*100 +
Urban population
 
URBAN
 
urban population / total population*100 –
Closeness Closeness of elections
 
CLOSE
 
Vote share of winning party less vote share of 
runner up party averaged at district level for a 
particular state
–
Social 
heterogeneity
Effective number of 
religious groups
 
SOCIAL
 
where 
 
n
 
i
 
 is the population of a religious group 
 
i
 
 
and 
 
N
 
 is the total population in an Indian state. 
+
SC population
 
SCPOP
 
% SC population +
ST population 
 
STPOP
 
% ST population +
Party system Contesting parties 
 
CONTEST
 
No. of contesting parties –
Other Separatist movement 
dummy
 
SEPR
 
Dummy variable during periods of separatist 
movements in the states of Punjab, Assam and 
Jammu & Kashmir
–
1
2
1
ni
Ni
M  
=
∑
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tend to change very slowly, FEM is also not a particularly suitable model for my
regression analysis. Beck and Katz (1995) and Beck (2001) suggest using OLS
regression coefficients, but with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and a
lagged dependent variable to model TSCS data.
 
14
 
 I follow their suggested methodol-
ogy, and use ordinary least squares (OLS) with PCSE, and include a lagged depen-
dent variable as one of the explanatory variables for my regression analysis.
 
15
 
 I also
include lagged dependent variables, and election dummies in alternative regression
models to test the robustness of my results.
 
Regression Results
 
Table 5 presents regression results using 
 
TURNOUT
 
 in the Indian states as the
dependent variable. Four main models (1–4) are presented with four sub-models
(a–d) within each basic model giving a total of 16 (1a–4d) regression models. The
sub-models are estimated using combinations of lagged dependent variables and
election dummies to test the robustness of the regression results. Model 1 includes
the socio-economic variables – number of electors, literacy rate and the degree of
urbanization in the state, while an additional variable representing closeness of
election is introduced in Model 2. Model 3 adds social heterogeneity variables to
Model 2, and finally Model 4 includes all the independent variables including the
party system variable and the dummy for the presence of a separatist movement.
Table 5 shows for each independent variable the estimated regression coefficient,
the associated 
 
p
 
 values and the R square for the model.
Model 1 includes three socio-economic independent variables 
 
ELECT, LITER
 
 and
 
URBAN
 
. Model 1a includes these independent variables without the use of any elec-
tion dummies or lagged dependent variables as additional independent variables. The
results are consistent with predictions, and the regression coefficients are of the
predicted sign and are statistically significant. Thus, while higher number of electors
and percentage of urban population in an Indian state reduces voter turnout, higher
literacy rate increases it. A 1% increase in literacy rate leads to 0.22% increase in
turnout, thus confirming the positive effect of improvement in literacy and education
on the voter participation rates in the Indian states. The results for urban population
are less strong, but statistically significant. A 1% increase in urban population is
associated with a reduction of 0.08% in turnout across the Indian states. This is
consistent with Yadav (2000: 126), who interprets the trend of rural turnout being
higher in India to explain the participatory upsurge amongst the underprivileged
participants. Thus, although increase in literacy rates increases turnout, the presence
of higher proportion of urban population reduces it. This can be interpreted by the
continuing apathy of the middle classes towards the political process by the urban
population. The result for the number of electors is also consistent with theory: a 1%
increase in number of electors leads to reduction of 0.2% in turnout.
 
16
 
 This is because
an increase in the number of electors leads to difficulty in mobilizing voters by
parties, and also makes the voting decision complex, leading to many voters deciding
not to vote. The R square for this model is 0.21.
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Table 5. Regression results
Model 1: Socio-economic variables Model 2: Socio-economic, closeness of election variables
Dependent: 
TURNOUT Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 2d
No. of electors 
(Log) (ELECT)
−1.52 (0.000)*** −1.20 (0.000)*** −0.88 (0.000)*** −0.71 (0.000)** −1.59 (0.000)*** −1.28 (0.000)*** −0.90 (0.000)*** −0.78 (0.000)***
Literacy rate 
(LITER)
0.22 (0.000)*** 0.39 (0.000)*** 0.04 (0.183) 0.16 (0.000)*** 0.20 (0.000)*** 0.36 (0.000)*** 0.02 (0.477)
Degree of 
urbanisation 
(URBAN)
−0.08 (0.017**) −0.13 (0.000)*** −0.04 (0.053)* −0.08 (0.000)**** −0.07 (0.031)** −0.13 (0.000)*** −0.04 (0.08)* −0.07 (0.0001***
Closeness of 
elections 
(CLOSE)
−9.72 (0.045)** −12.5 (0.01)*** −10.4 (0.017)** −10.7 (0.015)**
Turnout lagged 0.54 (0.000)*** 0.55 (0.000)*** 0.55 (0.000)*** 0.56 (0.000)***
Constant 54.2 41.3 29.4 20.9 57.2 45.3 31.3 24.3
Election 
dummies
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Lagged 
dependent 
variable
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R square 0.21 0.36 0.42 0.54 0.21 0.36 0.44 0.55
N 383 383 348 348 374 374 342 342
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Table 5. (Continued)
Model 3: Socio-economic, closeness of election, social heterogeneity 
variables
Model 4: All variables also including party system, Separatist movement 
variables
Dependent: 
TURNOUT Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c Model 4d
No. of electors 
(Log) (ELECT)
−1.64  (0.000)*** −1.28  (0.000)*** −0.91  (0.001)*** −0.79  (0.004)*** −1.54 (0.000)*** −1.18  (0.000)*** −0.80  (0.009)*** −0.65 (0.029)**
Literacy rate 
(LITER)
0.19  (0.000)*** 0.37  (0.000)*** 0.02 (0.610) 0.14 (0.016)** 0.19 (0.000)*** 0.34  (0.000)*** 0.02 (0.577)
Degree of 
urbanisation 
(URBAN)
−0.07 (0.053)* −0.14  (0.000)*** −0.04 (0.162) −0.08  (0.003)*** −0.06 (0.064)* 0.13  (0.000)*** −0.03 (0.197) −0.07 (0.010)***
Closeness of 
elections (CLOSE)
−10.1 (0.039)** −12.6 (0.009)*** −10.5 (0.016)** −10.8 (0.014)** −9.3 (0.05)** −12.2 (0.010)** −10.1 (0.019)** −10.7 (0.013)**
Social heterogeneity 
(SOCIAL)
2.2 (0.261) 0.85 (0.642) 1.7 (0.356) 0.63 (0.703) 3.22 (0.112) 2.1 (0.259) 2.3 (0.208)
SC population 
(SCPOP)
0.18 (0.135) 0.20 (0.057)* 0.10 (0.356) 0.12 (0.189) 0.20 (0.110) 0.22 (0.046)** 0.11 (0.308)
ST population 
(STPOP)
0.04 (0.171) 0.06 (0.089)* 0.03 (0.372) 0.034 (0.257) 0.05 (0.153) 0.05 (0.109) 0.03 (0.334)
No. of contesting 
parties (CONTEST)
−0.00 (0.567) −0.00 (0.232) −0.00 (0.367) −0.00 (0.123)
Separatist 
movement (SEPR)
−11.0 (0.007)*** −12.6 (0.000)*** −6.7 (0.099)* −7.6 (0.026)**
Turnout lagged 0.54 (0.000)*** 0.56 (0.000)*** 0.53 (0.000)*** 0.54 (0.000)***
Constant 51.2 39.2 27.5 20.8 49.6 39.7 27.3 22.8
Election dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Lagged dependent 
variable
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R square 0.21 0.48 0.45 0.56 0.23 0.39 0.45 0.57
N 374 374 342 342 374 374 342 342
Linear regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors (pcse). Figures in parenthesis represent p values; Model significance levels: *0.01; **0.05; ***0.001.
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Model 1b adds the election dummies to Model 1a. The objective of introducing
these dummies is to control for election-specific effects, and to test for the overall
robustness of the regression results. The sign for regression coefficients and their
statistical significance is consistent with Model 1a, while the value of the R square
increases to 0.36. Model 1c adds the lagged dependent variable to Model 1a , and its
results are similar to Model 1b except that literacy rate variable is no longer statisti-
cally significant, although it still has the predicted positive sign. The lagged depen-
dent variable is positive and statistically significant indicating that turnout is also
affected by turnout in the previous election. The explanation of the literacy variable
becoming insignificant may be that its effect can be seen in the lagged dependent
variable, since lagged turnout already contains the effect of the cross-sectional differ-
ences in literacy rates in the Indian states. The R square for Model 1c is higher than
Model 1b at 0.42. Model 1d adds both election dummies and the lagged dependent
variable to Model 1a. All the regression coefficients in this Model are statistically
significant and of the predicted sign, and the explanatory power of the model
increases with R square being 0.54.
To summarize, the results from Model 1 and its sub-models confirm the effect of
socio-economic variables on turnout in the Indian states. The regression coefficients
of these variables tend to be statistically significant and of the predicted signs. The
effect of number of electors and literacy rate is more prominent than that of presence
of large urban population. Further, turnout is also affected by turnout in the previous
election in the Indian states.
Model 2 adds the closeness of election variable CLOSE to the socio-economic
independent variables in Model 1. The regression results in Models 2a–2d are as
per predictions, with all the coefficients being of the predicted sign and all except
one variable (literacy rate in model 2c is not significant) being statistically signifi-
cant. The result for the closeness variable is significant and negative in all the four
sub-models. Thus, wherever the elections are closely fought – where difference
between the vote share of the winner and the runner-up candidate is small, the
turnout tends to be high. The results of Model 2d show that a 1% increase in the
difference of the vote share of the winning and the runner party leads to a 10.7%
decrease in turnout. The lagged turnout variable is positive and significant in
models 2c and 2d where it is used. The R square for models 2a–2d ranges from a
minimum of 0.21 in model 2a to the maximum of 0.55 in 2d. Overall, the close-
ness of elections and the literacy rate emerge as the most important independent
variables affecting turnout in the Indian states in Models 2a–2d.
Model 3 adds three social heterogeneity variables SOCIAL, SCPOP and STPOP
to Model 2. The results show that the three socio-economic variables and the close-
ness variable used in Models 1 and 2 continue to be statistically significant and of
the predicted sign in this more inclusive model. The coefficients for the three social
heterogeneity variables have the predicted positive sign in all the four sub-models,
even though these are not statistically significant with the exception of SCPOP and
STPOP (significant at 90% confidence level in Model 3b). Overall, the addition of
the social heterogeneity variables does not add to the explanatory power of the
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regression, and as such these variables do not appear to be affecting turnout in a
statistical significant way. The finding regarding the effect of SCPOP and STPOP in
this study are in line with McMillan (2000) whose evidence suggests that electoral
reservation has not affected the turnout of these social groups in India.
Model 4 is a comprehensive model which adds the party system variable
CONTEST and the separatist movement dummy SEPR to Model 3. The coefficient
for the party system variable is negative in all the sub-models 4a–4d, which is
consistent with predictions. Thus, an increase in the number of contesting parties
makes the voters’ choice difficult and is likely to reduce turnout. However, this
variable is not statistically significant in all the four sub-models. The coefficient of
the SEPR variable depicting the presence of a separatist movement is negative and
statistically significant in all the four sub-models 4a–4b. Thus, the hypothesized
negative effect of the presence of a separatist movement on turnout is confirmed
from the results of these models. Overall, the results in Model 4 are in line with the
pattern shown in Models 1–3; the socio-economic variables are of predicted signs
and are significant, and so is the closeness variable. However, the social heterogene-
ity and the party system variable are not statistically significant. The R square in
model 4d which includes all the explanatory variables, including the election
dummies and the lagged dependent variable is 0.57, and it is useful to analyse its
results further. Thus, the number of electors, literacy rate and the closeness of
elections are the most important variables affecting turnout across the Indian states,
while the effect of urban population is also significant although small in magnitude.
Thus, an increase in 1% in the number of electors leads to 0.52% decrease in turn-
out, while a similar increase in literacy rate leads to an increase in 0.11% in turnout.
The largest effect on turnout results from the closeness of election variable where a
1% increase in the difference of vote share between the winner and the runner-up
party leads to a decrease in turnout by 10.7%. Although social heterogeneity leads to
increase in turnout, its effects are not statistically significant. Finally, the presence
of a separatist movement depressed turnout by 7.6% compared with other states.
Conclusions
My results show that turnout varies widely across the Indian states, even as there
is a general upward trend witnessed in most of the states. In general, my empirical
findings support the prominent theories of voter turnout: close elections and
higher literacy lead to higher turnout, while larger electorates result in lower turn-
out. The results also show that the presence of a larger urban population depresses
turnout in the Indian states, and that the social heterogeneity variables are not
significant. This is consistent with Yadav (1996b, 1996c, 1999, 2000), who notes
that in India the incidence of voting is higher among the poor than among the
rich, among the less educated than the graduates, in the villages than in the cities.
Thus, it might be possible to increase turnout in the Indian states by improving
literacy rates, and motivating the urban population to vote in larger numbers.
Political parties and electoral institutions can influence turnout through improved
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94 R. Diwakar
communications, thereby reducing any information gap (for example see Zaller,
1991, 1992). The negative relationship between the number of electors and turn-
out can be addressed by minimizing mal-apportionment and creating smaller
states to improve voter–party co-ordination and voter mobilization. In terms of
future research agenda, my results highlight the importance of studying turnout at
the sub-national level, and a need to develop ways of studying the interactions
between the characteristics of the voters and the context in which the elections
take place. This is consistent with Blais’ (2006: 122) argument calling “for the
use of multi-level analysis, in which characteristics of voters interact with the
characteristics of the electoral context”.
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Notes
1. I used the term “States” to also include Union Territories – federal units which have relatively less
financial and administrative autonomy compared to other states. Currently, there are 28 states and 7
Union Territories in India.
2. General elections are held once every five years. After 1971, the next elections were held only in
1977 because of Emergency rule invoked in 1975.
3. For the sake of brevity, I limit the graphical display to 19 Indian states, which cover over 95% of
India’s electoral districts for the general elections.
4. These are estimated by regression taking turnout as the dependent variable and the election year as
the independent variable.
5. The states contained in the five regions are as follows – Hindi belt: Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan,
Uttaranchal, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Chhatisgarh, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh. North: Punjab,
Chandigarh, Jammu and Kashmir; West: Maharashtra, Gujarat, Goa, Dadra and Nagar Haveli. East:
Andaman and Nicobar Island, West Bengal, Assam, Orissa, Jharkhand; South: Andhra Pradesh,
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Lakshadweep, Pondicherry; North East: Arunachal Pradesh,
Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Sikkim, Tripura. This is consistent with Rudolph and
Rudolph (1987).
6. Important state reorganization took place in India in 1950s and 1960s, whereby many new states
were formed. For showing the trend in the chart, the pre-reorganization data has been linked to the
appropriate new states which were formed.
7. I use national elections data mainly to control for contextual factors at the national level. McMillan
(2005) and Yadav (2000) use data from assembly as well as national elections in their studies of turn-
out in India. The assembly elections in the Indian states take place at different points of time, and
therefore the national context in which these elections take place varies considerably. As Yadav
(1996a: 44) puts it, “For an overwhelming majority of underprivileged voters, the Lok Sabha elec-
tions have become not more than countrywide state-level elections. What looks like an unclear
verdict at the national level is an artificial summation of fairly clearly verdict at the state level”.
8. According to Blais (2000) and Norris (2002), education and income affect turnout in emerging
democracies.
9. Using Effective number of parties instead of the raw number of contesting parties does not affect the
empirical results.
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10. The elections for which the dummy variable is used are 1980, 1984 for Assam, 1980–1989 for
Punjab and 1989–2004 for Jammu & Kashmir. These elections were severely affected by extremism
and violence.
11. Successive electoral reforms and security measures have aimed to reduce the scope of activities such
as ballot-rigging and intimidation of voters on the polling day.
12. Appendix 2 shows the data sources for the variables used in this study. The information extracted
from Census of India, which is held every 10 years, has been extrapolated to match the election years.
13. Beck (2001) differentiates between TSCS and panel. Panel data are repeated cross-section data, but
the units are sampled, and they are typically observed only a few times. TSCS units are fixed; there is
no sampling scheme for the units. In panel data, the people observed are of no interest; all inferences
of interest concern the underlying population that was sampled. TSCS data are exactly the opposite;
all inferences of interest are conditional on the observed units.
14. This method has been widely used in the comparative politics literature for modelling of TSCS
data.
15. I have also run regressions using Random Effects Model and find that results are consistent with
the method suggested by Beck and Katz (1995). The regression results are shown in Appendix 3.
16. This is calculated by taking the exponential value of –1.52 which is the regression coefficient of no.
of electors (Log).
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Appendix 1: Turnout and Competitiveness Trends in 1957–1967 in Selected 
Indian States
Table A1 shows the turnout trends and the competitiveness of the elections (repre-
sented by ‘Closeness’ variable measured as vote share of winning party less vote
share of runner up party averaged at the constituency level for a particular state) in
selected Indian states and is useful for understanding the increase in turnout during
1957–1967.
Here, Closeness represents difference between vote share of the winning party
and the runner-up party in a constituency averaged for the particular state. Thus, a
decrease in Closeness means an increase in competitiveness of the election, and
therefore is likely to result in an increase in turnout. It can be seen that on an
average, elections in the states of Bihar, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh
were more competitive in 1967 than in 1957, and thus likely to produce higher
turnout. It can be seen that the turnout in these states did increase between 1957
and 1967, and therefore was in line with expectations. In Kerala and West Bengal,
the elections were actually less competitive in 1967, and thus a decrease in turnout
was likely. However, even for these states, the turnout increased between 1952 and
1967 indicating that in these states factors other than Closeness – such as increased
mobilization of voters by parties – is likely to have led to an increase in turnout. In
summary, it can be said that in the years following independence, an increase in
turnout was helped by an increase in competitiveness of political system through
development of opposition parties, as well as the efforts of the parties to mobilize
voters.
Table A1. Turnout and competitiveness trends in 1957–1967 in selected Indian states (%)
Closeness (winning party’s lead 
over runner-up party) Turnout
No. State 1957 1967 Trend 1957 1967 Trend
1 Uttar Pradesh 14 10 Increase in 
competitiveness
46 55 Increase 
in turnout
2 Bihar 17 13 Increase in 
competitiveness
41 52 Increase 
in turnout
3 Tamil Nadu 17 12 Increase in 
competitiveness 
47 77 Increase 
in turnout
4 West Bengal 9 11 Decrease in 
competitiveness
48 66 Increase 
in turnout
5 Kerala 7 17 Decrease in 
competitiveness
66 76 Increase 
in turnout
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Appendix 2: Data Sources
Variable Variable name Data source
Voter turnout TURNOUT Election Commission of India – election 
reports for general elections
No of electors ELECT Election Commission of India – election 
reports for general elections
Literacy rate LITER Census of India – various years, Indiastat.com 
available at LSE library
Urban population URBAN Census of India – various years, Indiastat.com 
available at LSE library
Closeness of elections CLOSE Election Commission of India – election 
reports for general elections
Social heterogeneity SOCIAL Census of India – various years, Indiastat.com 
available at LSE library
SC population SCPOP Census of India – various years, Indiastat.com 
available at LSE library
ST population STPOP Census of India – various years, Indiastat.com 
available at LSE library
No. of contesting 
parties 
CONTEST Election Commission of India – election 
reports for general elections
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Appendix 3: Regression Results using Random Effects Model (REM)
Dependent: TURNOUT REM
No. of electors (Log) (ELECT) −0.65 (0.025)**
Literacy rate (LITER) 0.11 (0.05)**
Degree of urbanisation (URBAN) −0.07 (0.023)**
Closeness of elections (CLOSE) −10.7 0.003**
Social heterogeneity (SOCIAL) 1.41 (0.361)
SC population (SCPOP) 0.13 (0.134)
ST population (STPOP) 0.03 (0.233)
No. of contesting parties (CONTEST) −0.00 (0.102)
Separatist movement dummy (SEPR) −7.6 (0.004)**
Turnout lagged 0.54 (0.000)***
Constant 22.7
Election dummies Yes
Lagged dependent variable Yes
R square 0.57
N 342
Figures in parenthesis represent p values; Model Significance levels: *0.01; **0.05;
***0.001.
